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Summary 
Prior scholarship is sharply divided on how or if globalization influences welfare states.  
Globalization’s effects may be positive causing expansion, negative triggering crisis and 
reduction, curvilinear contributing to convergence, or insignificant.  We bring new evidence to 
bear on this crucial debate with a pooled time series analysis of two measures of the welfare state 
and 16 indicators of economic globalization for 17 affluent democracies from 1975 to 1998.  The 
analysis suggests that: (1) state-of-the-art welfare state models warrant revision in the 
globalization era; (2) most indicators of economic globalization do not have significant effects; 
(3) the few significant globalization effects are in different directions and often inconsistent with 
extant theories; (4) the globalization effects are far smaller than the effects of domestic political 
and economic factors; and (5) these effects are not systematically different for liberal vs. non-
liberal welfare state regimes, European vs. non-European countries, or with four alternative 
dependent variables.  Increased globalization and a modest convergence of the welfare state have 
occurred, but globalization does not unambiguously cause welfare state expansion, crisis and 
reduction or convergence. 
Zusammenfassung  
Bisherige Befunde der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung zum kausalen Verhältnis von 
‚Globalisierung’ und Wohlfahrtsstaat sind nicht eindeutig. Danach kann Globalisierung positive 
Effekte haben und zu einem Ausbau an Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit führen, eine Krise des 
Wohlfahrtsstaates oder Leistungsreduktionen herbeiführen, kurvilineare Wirkungen aufweisen 
und zu Konvergenz beitragen, als auch vollkommen insignifikant sein. Unsere gepoolte 
Zeitreihenanalyse von Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und ‚Globalisierung’ in 17 reichen Demokratien 
(1975-1998) hat folgende Befunde zu Tage gefördert: (1) im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
erscheinen bestehende Wohlfahrtsstaatsmodelle revisionsbedürftig; (2) die Mehrzahl der 
ökonomischen Globalisierungsindikatoren weist keine signifikanten Effekte auf;  (3) die wenigen 
signifikanten Effekte zeigen in unterschiedliche Richtungen und stimmen häufig nicht mit 
bestehenden theoretischen Annahmen überein; (4) die Globalisierungseffekte sind deutlich kleiner 
als die Effekte binnenpolitischer Variablen und ökonomischer Faktoren; (5) diese Effekte 
unterscheiden sich in ‚liberalen’ und ‚nicht-liberalen’ Wohlfahrtsregimen bzw. europäischen und 
nicht-europäischen Ländern nicht systematisch von einander. Im Analysezeitraum können wir 
sowohl einen Anstieg der verschiedenen Globalisierungsindikatoren sowie eine moderate 
Konvergenz der verschiedenen Wohlfahrtsstaaten konstatieren. Jedoch kann der Prozess der 
‚Globalisierung’ nicht eindeutig als kausale Ursache für die unterschiedlichen 
Entwicklungsrichtungen in den verschiedenen Wohlfahrtsstaaten identifiziert werden.  
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the most pressing social science controversies regards the relationship between 
globalization and the state, and especially economic globalization and the welfare state.  
Scholars, public figures, analysts and theorists have all contributed to an extensive and 
rapidly growing literature.  Among many, a consensus is emerging that globalization has at 
least some type of relationship with the welfare state – even if the exact nature of that 
relationship remains unclear.  Fundamentally, this consensus suggests that analysts need to 
consider the global economy when studying what have traditionally been considered 
domestic political phenomena (Berger 2000; Evans 1997; Guillén 2001).  As Milner and 
Keohane (1996:3) remark, “We can no longer understand politics within countries – what 
we still conventionally call ‘domestic’ politics – without comprehending the nature of the 
linkages between national economies and the world economy, and changes in such 
linkages.”  Despite this emerging consensus, many social scientists remain skeptical that 
globalization really is a significant influence on welfare states. 
Prior scholarship offers several different theories of how economic globalization will or will 
not affect the welfare state.  Theories of positive, negative, curvilinear or insignificant 
effects can be contrasted with each other, and may even be irreconcilable.  Our goal is to 
empirically scrutinize these contrasting theories.  We analyze pooled time series data for 17 
affluent democracies from 1975 to 1998.  We concentrate on two conventional, general 
measures of the welfare state: government expenditures and social security transfers.1  We 
measure globalization with sixteen different indicators, reflecting different images of 
advantage, openness or threat.  Hence, our goal is to examine comprehensively the possible 
effects of different facets of economic globalization for two general measures of the welfare 
state.  To our knowledge, the extant literature does not contain a similar comprehensive 
study that assesses different theories of globalization and the welfare state in this most 
recent historical period. 
                                                   
1 Of course, we recognize that these two measures of the welfare state are not perfect or ultimate 
indicators.  There is certainly more research to be done on other aspects of the welfare state as well.  
However, as we argue below, these measures may be two of the more central and important indicators.  
Thus, these measures certainly warrant empirical attention.  Also, we examine four alternative 
dependent variables in our sensitivity analyses. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
 
Images of globalization vary widely (Guillén 2001).  We restrict our focus to economic 
globalization (henceforth simply referred to as “globalization”).  We conceptualize 
globalization as the intensification of international economic exchange and the label for the 
contemporary era of international economic integration.  Thus, globalization involves the 
current economic environment shaping welfare states and the heightening of concrete 
economic exchanges between countries. 
Four theories of the relationship between globalization and the welfare state have emerged.2  
First, globalization may cause an expansion of the welfare state.  Second, globalization may 
generate a crisis and retrenchment of the welfare state.  Third, globalization may have 
curvilinear effects and contribute to a convergence of welfare states.  Fourth, warranting 
attention are skeptics that contend that globalization does not affect the welfare state. 
2.1 Globalization as Expansion 
Following Cameron’s (1978) finding of a positive association between international 
economic openness and state size, many scholars have claimed that globalization expands 
the welfare state.  The small West European countries especially, as well as others, 
historically have been very outwardly oriented, engaging in high levels of international 
economic exchange (Katzenstein 1985).  In turn, countries experienced greater volatility 
and uncertainty with fluctuations in international finance and trade.  To stabilize the 
economic security of their citizens in this context, these countries developed generous 
welfare programs and corporatist labor market institutions.  Garrett (1998a) contends that 
globalization generates new constituencies for leftist parties among those made insecure by 
globalization, and in turn, leftist parties have greater incentives to expand the welfare state.  
Welfare states are expanded to compensate those harmed by economic openness, and to 
stabilize the economic resources of those experiencing the volatility of global markets 
(Rieger and Leibfried 2003; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001).  Consistent with these arguments, many 
                                                   
2 Our characterization of the literature seems consistent with how Hicks (1999: 204) divides “the 
openness literature” into compensation (positive) and competitiveness (negative) perspectives, as well 
as his findings that openness has curvilinear effects and his acknowledgement that some view 
globalization as insignificant. 
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quantitative studies have found that globalization has linear positive effects on welfare 
states (Garrett 1996, 1998b; Rodrik 1997, 1998).  Hicks (1999), for example, finds that 
trade openness significantly increases social welfare expenditures.  Garrett and Mitchell 
(2001) show that foreign direct investment openness is associated with greater taxation. 
2.2 Globalization as Crisis and Reduction 
In recent years, social scientists (Albrow 1997; Kennedy 1993; Ohmae 1990, 1995; 
Robinson 2004; Waters 1995), humanities scholars (Hardt and Negri 2001), and journalists 
(Friedman 1999; Greider 1997; Yergin and Stanislaw 1998) have claimed that globalization 
is causing a crisis and reduction of the welfare state.  On one level, many contend that 
globalization marks the era of welfare state crisis (Cable 1995; Esping-Anderson 1996; 
Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Strange 1995).3  Sometime after the 1973 Oil 
Crisis and the end of fixed exchange rates, and fully taking hold in the 1980s, welfare states 
have undergone retrenchment (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Hicks 1999: 215).  The era of 
globalization necessitates a decline of the welfare state, as states lose sovereignty over 
welfare state politics in the face of the overwhelming global economy (Boswell and Chase-
Dunn 1999; Castells 1996; Cerny 1994; Harvey 1995; Held et al. 1999; Sassen 1996; 
Strange 1996, 1997; Stryker 1998).  States undergo neoliberal restructuring in order to 
foster flexibility and competitiveness in a new, more globalized economy (Brenner 2002; 
Jessop 2002; Standing 1999).  For example, Stephens and his colleagues (1999: 191) 
explain, “Overall, then, by the late 1980s and early 1990s a picture of widespread cuts 
emerges, in some cases of considerable magnitude.”  Huber and Stephens (2001b: 123) 
summarize, “We find that roll-backs and ‘restructurings’ in welfare state programmes have 
been a universal phenomenon in the past two decades.”  Due to increasing globalization 
pressures, generous welfare states are uncompetitive (Alesina and Perotti 1997; Lindbeck 
1995).  After Sweden’s economic crisis in the 1990s, Freeman and his colleagues (1997) 
characterized its encompassing welfare state as “nearly impossible for the country to 
afford” (p. 11), “unsustainable” (p. 25), and “dysfunctional” (p. 27).  Relatedly, expanding 
                                                   
3 Language of “crisis” has been widespread.  Huber and Stephens (2001a) titled their recent book “The 
Development and Crisis of the Welfare State.”  In Hicks’ (1999) recent book, chapter titles include 
“The Growth and Crisis of the Welfare State” and “Course and Causes of the Crisis.”  In Sassoon’s 
(1996) monumental history of the 20th century West European Left, “Crisis” is the title of the third and 
final book.  Sassoon (1996: 772) states, “To a large extent, the contemporary crisis of [West European] 
socialism is a by-product of the globalization of capitalism.” 
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international economic arrangements cultivate an environment where welfare states are not 
likely to thrive.  For example, the continuing integration and expansion of the European 
Union has coincided with a movement for a thinner welfare state (Hooghe and Marks 
1999).  As Pierson and Leibfried (1995: 35) predict about European Union social policy, 
“The widespread expectation is that policies, if they are enacted at all, will take the form of 
standards set at or near those of the least generous members of the Union.” 
On another level, scholars contend globalization is a major cause of welfare state reduction 
(Rhodes 1996; Scharpf 1991; Scholte 1997; Schwartz 2001; Strange 1995, 1996, 1997).  
Globalization triggers a race to the bottom, where workers are recommodified, citizens have 
less social security, and capital dominates the state (Mishra 1999).  International economic 
competition and integration force governments to scale back expensive welfare programs 
(Cable 1995; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Huber and Stephens 2001a: 227; Schulze and 
Ursprung 1999; Steinmo 1994).  Volatile capital mobility in unregulated global markets 
reduces the capacity of states to intervene in economies (Evans 1997: 66; Milner and 
Keohane 1996).  Gilbert (2002: 38) concludes, “With the emergence of a well-integrated 
global market, however, national policymakers are increasingly being disciplined, and 
spending on redistributive social benefits is squeezed by the mobility of capital to go where 
production costs are low.”  Consequently, other states are forced to follow suit, and all 
retrench towards welfare state residualism.  For example, Garrett and Mitchell (2001) find 
that trade and financial openness are associated with less government spending.  Swank and 
Steinmo (2002) conclude that globalization significantly changes the politics of taxation.  
Burgoon (2001) shows that trade openness reduces several measures of the welfare state.  
Stephens and his colleagues (1999: 164) explain, “It is by now a widely accepted view that 
the sea change in advanced capitalist economies of the past two decades, above all the 
increasing internationalization of these economies, have constricted the policy options of 
the governments of these societies.”  Huber and Stephens (2001a: 11) write, “Since the 
1980s, different dimensions of globalization have weakened both the economic and political 
bases of generous welfare states.” 
2.3 Globalization as Curvilinear Effects and Convergence 
Most recently, a new line of thinking has emerged from empirical research on globalization 
and the welfare state.  A number of scholars contend that globalization has a curvilinear 
relationship with the welfare state (Hicks 1999; Rodrik 1997).  At lower initial levels, 
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globalization originally triggered an expansion of the welfare state with economic 
development.  But at higher levels, globalization can cause contractions in mature, 
generous, already developed welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2001a: 237, 240; Rodrik 
1997; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001).  This theory unites the first two views of globalization’s effects 
on the welfare state.  In quantitative welfare state models, globalization has a positive effect 
in the linear main term, but has a negative effect in the squared term.  For example, Hicks 
(1999: 213) finds that investment openness has such a curvilinear effect on social welfare 
expenditures, and provides some evidence that trade openness has a similar relationship.4  
Relatedly, Allan and Scruggs (2004) find that while trade openness had no effect on 
unemployment replacement rates before the welfare state development peak – a point they 
qualitatively define in each country in the early 1980s – trade openness has a significant 
negative effect after welfare states have matured. 
Curvilinear effects, to a certain extent, suggest a link between globalization and welfare 
state convergence (Greve 1996:350; Kosonen 1995; Montanari 2001:471; Scharpf 1997).  
According to this interpretation of curvilinear effects, globalization forces both high and 
low spenders towards mean levels of welfare effort.  Thus, a convergence interpretation 
builds from the empirical reality that more globalized economies tend to have more 
generous welfare states (Cameron 1978, Rodrik 1998).  For the highly globalized nations 
with generous welfare states, even greater levels of globalization would entail welfare 
retrenchment.  For the less globalized nations with minimal welfare states, globalization 
would trigger expansion.  Thus, globalization may force the most generous welfare states to 
reduce their extensiveness, and force the least generous welfare states to increase to a 
moderate, “normal” level.5  One can expect a process of symmetric convergence where big 
                                                   
4 Hicks (1999: 241) explains: “After the 1970s onset of economic troubles – heightened natural rates of 
unemployment, increased corporate policy leverage, and so on – world economic globalization ushered 
in an era of challenges to welfare state variation.  Intensifications of international economic 
competitiveness increased pressures for enhanced economic flexibility and efficiency.  These pressures, 
made writ by neoliberal economic orthodoxy, depressed state taxing, spending, and regulatory 
activity.”  Surprisingly, however, Hicks finds that trade openness increases the likelihood of a welfare 
retrenchment event and its square reduces the likelihood, and that investment openness squared has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of a welfare retrenchment event. 
5 For example, consider that Sweden has a generous welfare state and is highly globalized, while the U.S. 
is less globalized and has a minimal welfare state.  Curvilinear effects (positive and negative) would 
suggest convergence of these two countries.  If the U.S. increases from low to moderate levels of 
globalization, the welfare state would be expected to increase.  If Sweden increases from high to very 
high levels of globalization, the welfare state would be expected to decrease.  In turn, both would 
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spenders retrench while low spenders expand the welfare state.  In both cases, this is due to 
the need to make it politically feasible for the economy to be more exposed to international 
trade and capital (Garrett 1998a).  Even skeptics of globalization arguments concede that 
welfare state convergence has occurred in the globalization era (Williamson 1996; 
Wilensky 2002). 
2.4 Globalization as Insignificant 
Despite the extensive literature connecting globalization and the welfare state, many remain 
skeptical that globalization has any effect on the welfare state.  Several studies have sought 
to demonstrate that globalization is not causing welfare state reductions or convergence 
(Atkinson 2002; Bairoch 1996; Fligstein 2001; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Krugman 1994; 
Wade 1996; Wilensky 2002).  For example, Steinmo (2002) finds little evidence that 
globalization undermines the generous Swedish welfare state.  Others contend globalization 
is simply less salient than domestic politics (Gilpin 2001; Myles and Pierson 2001).  Many 
have emphasized that national histories, cultures and institutions continue to dominate the 
politics of each country’s unique welfare state (Berger 2000; Berger and Dore 1996; Boyer 
and Drache 1996; Kuhnle 2000).  Beyond the general claim that globalization is 
insignificant, globalization skeptics propose models that can categorized into four major 
theoretical alternatives.6 
First, a few studies have claimed that while globalization does not have general effects on 
all welfare states, globalization has contingent effects only in certain contexts.  
Globalization’s effects are conditional on specific institutional circumstances.  Swank 
(2002) contends that globalization does not threaten the generous social democratic and 
corporatist welfare states.  Rather, globalization only undermines the uncoordinated liberal 
welfare states, and should not have general effects across all countries (Hall and Soskice 
2001: 56-58).  In contrast, some have argued the most pronounced welfare state crisis is 
occurring in Western Europe and globalization, with other factors, underlies this crisis 
                                                                                                                                                     
converge towards mean welfare state levels.  Of course, there are other interpretations of curvilinear 
effects that would not necessarily entail convergence. 
6 To a certain extent, all welfare states theories that do not emphasize globalization could be viewed as 
alternatives to arguments that globalization has significant effects.  We concentrate on these four 
alternatives because they have been most prominent in trying to explain welfare states in the 
globalization era and/or have been posited against arguments that globalization has significant effects. 
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(Korpi 2003).  Thus, globalization might be expected to be more influential in European 
versus non-European countries.   
Second, one of the most prominent welfare state theories in recent years has contended that 
“new politics” govern social policy (Pierson 2001).  Pierson (1994, 1996) emphasizes that 
welfare states are resilient and have not experienced significant retrenchment or crisis.  
Advocates of a new politics approach contend that the welfare state represents the status 
quo in affluent democracies (Myles and Pierson 2001).  In mature welfare states, 
constitutional structure, power sharing across different institutions, and the popularity of 
programs with constituencies of beneficiaries prevents retrenchment.  The size and growth 
of populations of consumers of welfare benefits (e.g. the elderly) bolsters welfare state 
stability and even fosters further expansion.  One crucial extension of the new politics 
account is that partisanship and class politics became less relevant to understanding welfare 
state developments after the early 1980s (Huber and Stephens 2001a; Pierson 1996, 2001). 
Third, partly as a response to the new politics perspective, scholars have countered that 
“politics as usual” continues to drive the welfare state (Allan and Scruggs 2004).  These 
critics of the new politics account have argued that the traditional analyses of welfare 
spending or welfare effort obscure how class and partisan politics continue to influence the 
welfare state because the classic dependent variables miss the political action (Korpi 2003).  
Only with more sophisticated dependent variables can one detect how partisan and class 
politics explain welfare state variation and retrenchment.  For example, Korpi and Palme 
(2003) contend that power resources of labor and leftist mobilization explain welfare state 
retrenchment.  Allan and Scruggs (2004) emphasize that while left parties failed to expand 
the welfare state after their peaks in the early 1980s, right parties crucially instigated 
retrenchment after that point.  For Allan and Scruggs, left parties caused expansion of the 
welfare states in earlier years, while right parties triggered retrenchment after welfare states 
were institutionally mature. 
Fourth, contrasting with claims that globalization has either positive or negative effects, 
Iversen and Cusack (2000) contend that it is really deindustrialization that drives welfare 
state expansion (also Iversen 2001; Iversen and Wren 1998).  The decline of manufacturing 
and agricultural employment, the traditional sectors of domestic production, generates a 
decline of long-term stable employment for the working-class.  Thus, deindustrialization 
creates a large population that requires more government services and welfare state 
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spending.  Iversen and his collaborators have forcefully asserted that globalization’s effects 
are less relevant after considering the crucial decline of manufacturing and agricultural 
employment.  
3 Data, Methods and Measures 
Our study is based on a pooled time series analysis of 17 affluent democracies (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States) from 
1975 to 1998.  We analyze this period for substantive and methodological reasons.7  
Substantively, we begin after the 1973 Oil Crisis and the end of fixed exchange rates – i.e., 
the period when most approximate the beginning of the contemporary globalization era 
(Guillén 2001).  Methodologically, most globalization indicators are not available for most 
countries before 1975 and the welfare state measures are not available for the U.S. after 
1998.  For 14 countries, we have complete time series.  However, for three countries, 
missing data for several key globalization variables forced us to exclude some years.  The 
Ireland series includes 1991-1998, the Japan series is 1978-1998, and the Switzerland series 
is 1984-1998.  We re-estimated all models with each or all three of these countries excluded 
and the conclusions were identical (see footnote 20), so we decided to retain them in our 
sample.  As a result, our sample includes 380 country-years as cases. 
Following recent sociological pooled time series analyses of the welfare state (Hicks 1999; 
Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001a), we use Beck and Katz’s (1995) technique of ordinary 
least squares with panel corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE) and a first order 
autocorrelation correction (AR1).8  Though this strategy is arguably most defensible for the 
                                                   
7 To our knowledge, our study is one of the few to concentrate on this era and include the later 1990s 
(Allan and Scruggs 2004).  Beyond data limitations, we intentionally avoid reanalyzing the well-
examined longer period of welfare state development (i.e. 1960-present).  Instead, we concentrate on 
the sources of variation among mature welfare states in the globalization era.  
8 Despite this convention among sociologists, some political scientists argue for a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) instead of an AR1 correction (Beck and Katz 1996; Beck 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 
2001).  However, Plumper et al. (2004) show that our strategy is probably the most defensible.  
Plumper et al show that the t-scores of the LDVs are biased upwards and the coefficients and t-scores 
for other independent variables are biased downwards.  Nevertheless, we reestimated all models with a 
LDV, and our conclusions are consistent (details available upon request).  As another dynamic 
alternative, we estimated the Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel model, or generalized method of 
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purposes of this analysis (Beck 2001; Plümper et al. 2004), we experimented with panel 
techniques as well (also see footnote 8).9  Our conclusions were generally consistent with 
alternative techniques, so we confine our presentation to OLS-PCSE AR1 analyses. 
With statistical significance and basic fit statistics, the Bayesian Information Criterion 
Prime (BIC′) assists model comparison.  BIC′ selects the more parsimonious model unless 
model fit is significantly enhanced (Raftery 1995).  Specifically, the model with the greater 
negative value of BIC′ is preferred.  A BIC′ difference of 0-2 offers weak evidence, 2-6 
offers positive evidence, 6-10 offers strong evidence, and more than 10 offers very strong 
evidence.  We now describe the variables.  In Table 1, we provide the descriptive statistics 
and sources.  Data for many of the variables are proximately from Huber et al.’s (2004) 
Comparative Welfare States Database.  In Appendix I, we also provide a correlation matrix 
for the main variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources for Variables (N=380). 
 
 Mean Std Dev Sources 
Dependent    
Government Expenditures as % of 
GDP 
44.243 9.067 OECD (2003a) 
Social Security Transfers as % of 
GDP  
15.000 4.491 See Above 
Baseline Model    
Left Cabinet 13.378 10.718 Huber et al. (2004) 
Christian Democrat Cabinet .619 2.123 See Above 
Union Density 53.388 24.818 Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) 
Constitutional Structure 2.861 2.100 Huber et al. (2004) 
Female Labor Force Participation 58.898 10.559 OECD (2003a) 
Female Labor Force Part. * Left Party .503 4.033 See Above 
Voter Turnout 79.182 12.627 Huber et al. (2004) 
                                                                                                                                                     
moments estimator (details available upon request).  This technique also did not change our 
conclusions. 
9 Since the sample includes more years (24) than countries (17), Beck (2001) would argue that the dataset 
should be considered a pooled time series rather than a panel.  As a result, we use a pooled time series 
technique, rather than panel techniques, in this study.  In analyses available upon request, we estimated 
fixed effects models with a first order autocorrelation correction.  This technique did not change our 
conclusions. 
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Table 1 continued 
Elderly Population 13.582 2.143 OECD (2003b) 
Strikes 4.106 31.659 ILO (2003) 
Authoritarian Legacy 2.016 .853 Huber et al. (2004) 
GDP Per Capita 18762.800 3290.446 OECD (2003b) 
Year 11.929 6.889  
Inflation 5.794 4.341 IMF (2003) 
Unemployment 6.651 3.458 OECD (2003a) 
Military Spending 2.606 1.211 SIPRI (2003) 
Mfg. & Agric. Employment 34.975 7.122 OECD (2003a) 
Labor Power 32.998 27.920 Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); 
Kenworthy (2003) 
Right Cabinet 14.515 11.600 Huber et al. (2004) 
Globalization Advantage    
Inward FDI 1.014 1.062 IMF (2003) 
Inward PI 1.941 3.155 See Above 
Net Investment -.093 3.050 See Above 
Exports 30.911 14.983 See Above 
Net Trade 1.074 3.039 See Above 
Net Globalization 0.985 3.665 See Above 
Globalization Openness    
FDI Openness 2.381 2.179 See Above 
Investment Openness 6.033 7.372 See Above 
Trade Openness 60.747 28.618 See Above 
Total Globalization 66.688 32.272 See Above 
Capital Accounts Liberalization Index 3.274 .700 See Above 
Current Accounts Liberalization 
Index 
6.979 1.167 See Above 
Globalization Threat    
Outward FDI 1.367 1.379 See Above 
Outward PI 1.695 3.465 See Above 
Imports 29.837 13.770 See Above 
Net Migration 1.960 2.701 See Above 
Alternative Dependent Variables    
Government Revenue 42.898 8.396 OECD (2003a) 
Social Welfare Expenditures 22.681 6.205 OECD (2001) 
Public Employment 11.924 5.044 Cusack (2004) 
Public Health Spending 75.146 12.148 OECD (2003b) 
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3.1 Dependent Variables 
Our analysis focuses on two measures of the welfare state: Government Expenditures as % 
of GDP and Social Security Transfers as % of GDP.  The first dependent variable is all total 
current disbursements for general government (including central, state and local) and is a 
comprehensive measure of welfare state size.  The second includes all state-sponsored cash 
transfers for sickness, old age pensions, family allowances, unemployment and workers’ 
compensation and other assistance.  While the second concentrates on direct compensatory 
payments, the first incorporates Keynesian investments in public employment and active 
labor market programs, as well as the provision of social services (e.g. health care).  
Of course, there have been debates over how to measure the welfare state.  Some assert that 
these traditional measures do not fully reflect the true characteristics or dynamics of social 
policy (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Korpi 2003; Korpi and Palme 2003; Esping-Andersen 
1990, 1999).  While we appreciate these concerns, we contend that there are important 
reasons to continue to analyze these two measures.  First, among welfare state measures, 
government expenditures and social security transfers actually are most influential for 
inequality and poverty (Bradley et al. 2003; Brady 2003; Moller et al. 2003).10  Second, 
most previous research, and specifically most sociological research, has used these or 
similar measures.  Since our study explicitly builds on such work (e.g. Huber and Stephens 
2000, 2001a), it is appropriate to analyze some of the same dependent variables.  As we 
explain below, we also conduct sensitivity analyses with four alternative dependent 
variables to be certain that our conclusions are robust.  For most of our analyses, we 
concentrate on the two central dependent variables. 
3.2 Control Variables 
We begin our analysis by estimating a baseline model of established determinants of 
welfare state variation.  We start by replicating Huber and Stephens’ (2000, 2001a: 52-53) 
model with the same measures.  We use their model as a point of departure because it is an 
                                                   
10 If recent innovations truly improve welfare state measurement, they should have greater predictive 
validity for central outcomes like poverty or inequality.  Despite strong claims of measurement 
improvement, to our knowledge, no evidence of greater predictive validity is available for these novel 
alternatives. 
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influential state-of-the-art synthetic model that shares a great deal with most contemporary 
models of welfare effort (e.g., Hicks 1999).  We also build on their model because we are 
using the same dataset and we focus on the same dependent variables. 
Following convention, we lag all independent variables one year.  Left Cabinet is measured 
as the cumulative Left seats as a percent of government seats since 1946.  This variable was 
calculated by tabulating the Left seats as a percent of seats held by all government parties in 
each individual year and then summing these percentages since 1946.  Christian Democrat 
Cabinet is measured the same as Left Cabinet, but for centrist Catholic and Protestant 
parties.  We measure Union Density as gross union members as a percent of total wage and 
salaried employees.  Constitutional Structure is measured as the number of veto points 
created by constitutional provisions.11  Female Labor Force Participation is the percent of 
women aged 15 to 64 in the labor force.  We also include an Interaction of Female Labor 
Force Participation and Current Left Cabinet after both have been centered on their means.  
Voter turnout is measured as the percent of the adult population that voted in the most 
recent national election.  The Elderly Population is measured as the percent of the 
population over 65 years old.  Strikes is measured as the number of working days lost due to 
strikes per thousand workers.  Authoritarian Legacy is a dummy variable for an 
authoritarian regime in the late nineteenth century.  GDP Per Capita is the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in real purchasing power parity dollars, divided by the total population.  
Year is coded as 1975 = 0, 1976 = 1, 1977 = 2. . .1998 = 23.12  Inflation is measured as the 
annual percent change in the consumer price index.  Unemployment is the percent of the 
total labor force unemployed.  Military Spending is measured as a percent of GDP. 
Our baseline models also extend beyond Huber and Stephens by incorporating three 
additional independent variables.  First, following Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) emphasis on 
deindustrialization as the cause of welfare state expansion, we include Manufacturing and 
Agricultural Employment as a percent of the total labor force.  Second, influenced by Hicks’ 
                                                   
11 Huber and Stephens sum measures of federalism, presidential system, single member districts plurality 
electoral systems, the strength of bicameralism, the frequency of referendums, and judicial review.   
12 Though we follow Huber and Stephens’ (2000, 2001a) detrending approach, some may be concerned 
with our including both an AR1 correction and year.  In turn, we estimated models without the AR1 
correction and the conclusions do not change.  The year coefficient may be collinear with a few 
independent variables.  So, we estimated models without the year coefficient and with the AR1 
correction and none of the conclusions were different.  Thus, we concluded that including both the year 
and AR1 correction does not bias our results. 
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(1999) persuasive account of the central role of corporatism and working class mobilization 
for welfare state development, we include a measure of Labor Power.  We construct the 
measure of labor power by multiplying the aforementioned union density and Kenworthy’s 
(2003) index of neocorporatism.  Third, based on recent studies of welfare state variation in 
the contemporary era (e.g. Allan and Scruggs 2004), we include a measure of Right 
Cabinet, which is a historically cumulative variable like the left and Christian Democrat 
cabinet variables.  Our measure sums “right” parties, “right, Christian” parties, and “right, 
Catholic” parties in Huber et al. (2004). 
3.3 Economic Globalization Measures 
Our study aims to improve upon existing studies of globalization and the welfare state.  
Hence, our operationalization of globalization is guided by three main concerns.  First, we 
focus on the largest dimensions of international economic exchange.  Thus, we do not limit 
our focus to exchange with developing countries.  Sometimes, analysts do so in order to test 
a precise hypothesis concerning, for example, investment fleeing to or imports from 
developing countries (Alderson 1999; Burgoon 2001).  Unfortunately, this has the 
consequence of omitting the vast majority of the globalization experienced by affluent 
democracies.  Most international economic exchange occurs among affluent democracies, 
so it is essential to incorporate investment in and trade with all countries (Gilpin 2001; Hirst 
and Thompson 1996).  Second, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the multiple facets 
of globalization.  Often, globalization has been operationalized with only a few convenient 
indicators like trade openness.  We embrace the reality that the measurement of 
globalization is contested and the literature has yet to converge on a single measure (Guillén 
2001; Held et al. 1999).  Thus, our analysis features a wide variety of indicators of 
globalization.  As our analysis reveals below, doing so is advantageous.  Different 
indicators reveal different effects and a broader variety of indicators provides a more 
comprehensive examination of globalization. 
Third, our measures of globalization are motivated by key conceptual distinctions.  
Globalization has been conceptualized as advantage (the benefits from outward flowing 
goods and services and inward flowing investment), openness (the sheer extent to which 
national economies are accessible to international exchange), and threat (the danger of 
inward flowing goods, services and labor and outward flowing investment).  For the most 
part, the various theories of globalization’s effects have tended to rely on distinct 
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conceptions of globalization.  Globalization as expansion has focused on advantage and 
openness.  Globalization as crisis and retrenchment has focused on openness and threat.  
Globalization as curvilinear effects and convergence has incorporated all three.  Concretely, 
globalization includes trade, direct and portfolio investment, the legal institutions enabling 
international exchange (Quinn 1997), and the migration of labor.  Cross-classifying these 
concepts with concrete measures, we seek to provide a comprehensive examination of 
globalization’s possible effects on the welfare state.13  Most of our globalization indicators 
are expressed as a percent of GDP – we note when they are not. 
First, we include six indicators of globalization advantage.  Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) represents capital flows where a foreign firm acquires at least a 10% 
ownership share and management of a domestic firm or facility.  Inward Portfolio 
Investment (PI) is bond or equity financial flows that amount to less than a 10% ownership 
of domestic firms by foreign investors.  Net Investment is the difference of inward minus 
outward (see below) FDI and PI.  Inward investment and positive net investment are 
advantages of globalization in that they strengthen the national economy by increasing 
capital.  As they are the opposite of capital flight, it should not constrain the welfare state.  
Exports are the value of all goods and services flowing out of a country and into a foreign 
country.  Net Trade is the difference between exports and imports (see below) – positive 
values indicate a trade surplus and negative values indicate a trade deficit.  Net 
Globalization is a new measure that sums net investment and net trade, and represents the 
extent to which countries export more than they import and receive more investment than 
they send out.  This measure distinguishes between countries that “win” vs. those that 
“lose” from globalization, including both investment and trade dimensions. 
                                                   
13 We do not think it is possible (or advisable) to select only a few indicators as perfect tests of each 
theory of globalization’s effects.  Instead, we follow Guillén (2001: 255): “Globalization is neither a 
monolithic nor an inevitable phenomenon.  Its impact varies across countries, societal sectors, and 
time.  It is contradictory, discontinuous, even haphazard.  Therefore, one needs to be open-minded 
about its unexpected and unintended consequences.”  Many of the globalization indicators have been 
previously examined, so for those, we are simply following convention.  However, we move beyond 
past research by bringing them all together and incorporating new measures.  Despite the expansion of 
portfolio investment and the increased international liberalization of markets, these have been relatively 
neglected.  Furthermore, immigration is the core measure of labor globalization, yet has rarely been 
analyzed.   
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Second, we consider six measures of globalization openness.14  FDI Openness is the sum of 
inward and outward FDI.  Investment Openness is the sum of inward and outward FDI and 
inward and outward PI.  Trade Openness is the sum of exports and imports.  Total 
Globalization is a new measure that sums trade openness and investment openness.  Capital 
Accounts Liberalization Index is Quinn’s (1997) measure of the legal openness for capital 
accounts transactions across national boundaries.  Current Accounts Liberalization Index is 
Quinn’s measures of the legal openness of national boundaries to current accounts 
transactions. 
Third, we analyze four measures of globalization threat.  Outward FDI represents capital 
flows where a domestic firm acquires at least a 10% ownership share and management of a 
foreign firm or facility.  This variable represents capital flight.  Outward PI is bond or 
equity financial flows that amount to less than a 10% ownership of foreign firms by 
domestic investors.  Imports are the value of all goods and services flowing into a domestic 
economy from a foreign country.  Net Migration is the difference between the domestic 
population in the previous and current year that remains after accounting for births and 
deaths.15  Positive values indicate net in-migration, while negative values represent net out-
migration. 
4 Results 
In the tables below, we present analyses for both dependent variables: government 
expenditures and social security transfers.  Our analysis involves five stages.  First, we 
establish a baseline model.  Second, we analyze the linear relationship between 
globalization and the welfare state net of the baseline.  Third, we examine the possible 
curvilinear relationship between globalization and the welfare state net of the baseline.  
                                                   
14 Typically, scholars measure trade openness and simply called it “economic openness.”  We feel that 
analysts need to be more precise, since we show that direct and portfolio investment and trade have 
different effects. 
15 Unfortunately, more valid and reliable cross-national and historical data on immigration are simply not 
available.  The OECD provides data on variables like the percent of the population foreign born, but 
these data are not available before the mid-1980s, and even after then are spotty for many nations.  We 
appreciate that these net migration estimates should be interpreted with caution.  There is a certain 
circular reasoning in that the population, birth and death estimates are actually based themselves on 
statistical estimates of immigration. 
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Fourth, we present final models with the baseline and the most significant globalization 
effects.  Fifth, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses with sub-samples and alternative 
dependent variables. 
4.1 Baseline Models 
The first models in Table 2 are the baseline Huber and Stephens (2001a) model.  Several 
key variables are significant for both dependent variables.  Left cabinet, the elderly 
population, authoritarian legacy, and unemployment are significantly positive, and 
constitutional structure is significantly negative.  However, some central variables in Huber 
and Stephens “power constellations” approach fail to reach significance: Christian 
Democrat cabinet does not significantly affect social security transfers, and union density, 
the interaction of female labor force participation and current left cabinet, voter turnout, 
strikes, and inflation are insignificant for both dependent variables.  Notably, some 
coefficients have significant effects in the opposite direction from previous research: GDP 
per capita and female labor force participation significantly decrease social security 
transfers, and military spending significantly increases both dependent variables.  These 
results confirm that the causal processes generating welfare state development in earlier 
periods do not entirely explain variation across welfare states from 1975 to 1998 (Allan and 
Scruggs 2004; Pierson 2001) – something recognized by Huber and Stephens (2001) and 
Hicks (1999). 
Given the modest performance of the Huber-Stephens model, we revised it by dropping all 
variables where the t-score fails to reach the lenient threshold of 1.0 for either dependent 
variable.  In the second models, we omit union density, the interaction of female labor force 
participation and current left cabinet, and the strikes variable.  The reader may be concerned 
with our omission of union density, given its prominent role in power resources theory 
(Hicks 1999; Korpi and Palme 2003).  However, Huber and Stephens make the same choice 
because of the high correlation between left cabinet and union density (r=.65).  Since the 
two are causally related, it is often difficult to include both in the same model.  These 
revised models perform better than the first.  BIC′ positively prefers both second models, 
and the effects of the variables are relatively robust in these more parsimonious models. 
 21
Table 2:  OLS-PCSE Baseline Models of Welfare State Measures in Seventeen Developed 
Democracies, 1975-1998 (N=380). 
 
 Government Expenditures 
 
Social Security Transfers 
Left Cabinet 
 
.184** 
(2.40) 
.210*** 
(2.72) 
.070 
(.88) 
 .096** 
(2.53) 
.086** 
(2.39) 
.041 
(1.07) 
 
Christian 
Democrat 
Cabinet 
.679** 
(2.11) 
.566* 
(1.66) 
.272 
(.84) 
 .478 
(1.41) 
.452 
(1.27) 
.439 
(1.20) 
 
Union Density 
 
.028 
(.89) 
   -.006 
(-.30) 
   
Constitutional  
Structure 
-.920*** 
(-2.86) 
-.977*** 
(-3.04) 
-.851*** 
(-2.70) 
-.596* 
(-1.89) 
-.089 
(-.29) 
-.024 
(-.13) 
.052 
(.27) 
-.048 
(-.24) 
Female Labor  
Force 
Participation 
-.016 
(-.23) 
-.008 
(-.12) 
-.070 
(-1.03) 
-.032 
(-.49) 
-.074* 
(-1.67) 
-.068 
(-1.47) 
-.075 
(-1.54) 
-.093** 
(-2.06) 
Female Lab. 
Force Part. * 
Left Party 
-.025 
(-.50) 
   -.013 
(-.51) 
   
Voter Turnout .040 
(1.19) 
.040 
(1.18) 
.019 
(.55) 
.026 
(.77) 
-.023 
(-1.01) 
-.020 
(-.86) 
-.021 
(-.89) 
-.025 
(-1.14) 
Elderly 
Population 
.770** 
(2.59) 
.747** 
(2.42) 
.882*** 
(2.68) 
.788** 
(2.51) 
.632*** 
(3.66) 
.619*** 
(3.45) 
.576*** 
(3.12) 
.568*** 
(3.35) 
Strikes 
 
.002 
(.50) 
   .001 
(.56) 
   
Authoritarian 
Legacy 
1.368** 
(2.23) 
1.341** 
(2.08) 
2.444*** 
(3.11) 
2.584*** 
(3.29) 
.929** 
(2.24) 
.842* 
(1.84) 
.721 
(1.40) 
.930** 
(2.12) 
GDP Per Capita -.0001 
(-.43) 
-.0002 
(-.84) 
-.001* 
(-1.92) 
-.001** 
(-2.56) 
-.0004** 
(-2.46) 
-.0004*** 
(-2.94) 
-.0005*** 
(-3.27) 
-.0004*** 
(-3.12) 
Year 
 
.051 
(.30) 
.082 
(.50) 
-.037 
(-.20) 
.169 
(.87) 
.123 
(1.49) 
.152* 
(1.93) 
.194** 
(2.22) 
.224** 
(2.44) 
Inflation 
 
.102 
(1.56) 
.103 
(1.59) 
.110* 
(1.74) 
.092 
(1.47) 
.033 
(1.07) 
.033 
(1.10) 
.034 
(1.13) 
.022 
(.69) 
Unemployment 
 
.341** 
(2.40) 
.319** 
(2.42) 
-.130 
(-.86) 
-.224 
(-1.58) 
.090 
(1.13) 
.061 
(.86) 
.003 
(.03) 
-.061 
(-.71) 
Military  
Spending 
1.431*** 
(3.43) 
1.349*** 
(3.17) 
.972** 
(2.18) 
1.082** 
(2.45) 
.414* 
(1.79) 
.418* 
(1.83) 
.465** 
(1.97) 
.545** 
(2.38) 
Mfg. & Agric.  
Employment 
  -.554*** 
(-4.32) 
-.518*** 
(-3.96) 
  -.032 
(-.46) 
-.094 
(-1.30) 
Labor Power 
 
  .060** 
(2.23) 
.037 
(1.38) 
  .032** 
(2.54) 
.028** 
(2.12) 
Right Cabinet 
 
   -.236*** 
(-3.30) 
   -.074** 
(-2.35) 
Constant 21.267*** 
(3.18) 
24.405*** 
(3.50) 
55.515*** 
(5.85) 
58.058*** 
(6.19) 
12.602*** 
(3.48) 
13.059*** 
(3.50) 
15.719*** 
(2.75) 
20.783*** 
(3.38) 
R2 .757 .748 .761 .764 .540 .523 .523 .548 
BIC′ -448.794 -452.633 -461.365 -471.791 -205.648 -209.849 -197.969 -224.610 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-scores.  Models include a first-order serial autocorrelation 
correction.  All independent variables are lagged one year. 
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In the third models, we follow Iversen and Cusack and add manufacturing and agricultural 
employment, and follow Hicks and add labor power.  Both are significant for government 
expenditures, but only labor power significantly affects social security transfers.  As 
countries deindustrialized from 1975 to 1998, government expenditures expanded.  Unlike 
Iversen and Cusack, we do not find that deindustrialization caused an increase in social 
security transfers.  Interestingly, the significant effect of labor power only occurs for the 
combination of union density and corporatism.  In models by themselves (or alternatively 
with wage coordination), the coefficients are not statistically significant (not shown).  The 
combination of these two aspects of labor power strengthens the welfare state.  Importantly, 
after including manufacturing and agricultural employment and labor power, several central 
variables in the Huber-Stephens power constellations model are insignificant. 
After controlling for deindustrialization and labor power in the third models, both left and 
Christian Democrat cabinet are now insignificant.  Huber and Stephens claimed that 
partisan differences were narrowing in recent years, and recognized that the party variables 
might not be significant in the post-development era (also Pierson).  However, before 
controlling for manufacturing and agricultural employment and labor power, the significant 
left cabinet effects remained.  Rather, the insignificance of left and Christian Democrat 
parties occurs after including those powerful two new variables.  At this stage, our analysis 
challenges the power constellations approach.  Since labor power is significant and left and 
Christian Democrat cabinet are insignificant, our results support Hicks’ account of the 
paramount influence of corporatism, class politics and unionization.16 
Last, the fourth models add right cabinet, which significantly decreases both dependent 
variables.  Moreover, BIC′ very strongly prefers the fourth models over all other models in 
Table 2.  Clearly, right parties have been a powerful source of welfare retrenchment.  Once 
right parties are included, labor power does not significantly increase government 
expenditures, but it continues to significantly increase social security transfers.  Thus, our 
results ultimately provide evidence that parties continue to play a mediating role for 
                                                   
16 The results are most supportive of the power constellations approach with Huber and Stephens’ 
cumulative measure of left cabinet.  In analyses available on request, we substituted the cumulative left 
cabinet variable with a current left cabinet variable.  In all models (including what would be the first 
two models of Table 2), the current left cabinet variable fails to reach statistical significance.  Another 
problem with the left party measures is that the U.S. and Canada are zero for every year since their 
“left” parties (e.g. U.S. Democrats) are coded as centrist. 
 23
government expenditures, but we find it is right cabinet, and not left or Christian democrat 
cabinet, that matters.  For social security transfers, both labor power and right cabinet have 
significant effects, and unsurprisingly, they are in opposite directions.  Unlike the new 
politics literature, these results show that parties and labor continue to shape welfare states 
in the post-development globalization era.17 
4.2 Linear Effects of Globalization 
Before discussing globalization’s effects, we present the patterns in globalization from 1975 
to 1998.  Figure 1 shows that, in fact, globalization dramatically increased.  The dark solid 
line shows the average total globalization (investment openness + trade openness) over the 
period.  Total globalization nearly doubled, rising from 55.8 to 102.7 percent of GDP.  
Despite fluctuation, the long-term increase was secular.  On average, affluent democracies 
increasingly engaged in international economic exchange.  The dashed line in this figure 
displays the average net globalization (net trade + net investment).  Net globalization 
exhibits a great deal of fluctuation without a clear trend.  In the early 1990s, our sample 
exported much more and received more investment, than imported and lost investment.  
But, by the late-1990s, affluent democracies were again, on average, slightly negative net 
globalizers.  The 1993 spike is driven partly by the addition of Ireland to our sample in 
1991, whereas the addition of Japan in 1978 and Switzerland in 1984 did not affect the 
general patterns.  Overall, globalization increased substantially between 1975 and 1997, but 
involved less consistent patterns of net inward and outward flows. 
                                                   
17 These results seem consistent with Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Korpi and Palme (2003) – especially 
as they challenge the new politics literature about the declining impact of parties and classes.  
However, Allan and Scruggs and Korpi and Palme contend that it is necessary to use alternative 
welfare state measures in order to reach this conclusion.  We show that such alternatives are not 
necessary, but that better model specification is essential. 
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Figure 1. Economic Globalization in 17 Affluent Democracies, 
1975-1998
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Displaying the trends in our two dependent variables is also instructive.  Figure 2 displays 
the averages of our two dependent variables from 1975 to 1998.  During the time 
globalization substantially increased, the two welfare state measures were remarkably 
stable.  By 1975, the welfare state was institutionalized as the average government 
expenditures was 41 percent of GDP and the average social security transfers was 13.7.  
Both government expenditures and social security transfers reached high points in 1983 
(46.7 and 15.5).  However, they peaked again in 1993: 47 for government expenditures and 
16.7 for social security transfers.  Moreover, both measures were actually higher in 1998 
(42.4 and 14.8) than in 1975.  Adding Japan (1978), Switzerland (1984) and Ireland (1991) 
was inconsequential to the average values.  The stability in the measures problematizes the 
language of “crisis” in the recent literature.  Given that this era combines increasing 
globalization with welfare state stability, the basic descriptive evidence does not clearly 
support claims about globalization’s positive or negative effects on the welfare state. 
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Figure 2.  Means of Two Welfare State Measures as 
% of GDP in 17 Affluent Democracies, 1975-1998
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In Table 3, we analyze the relationship between globalization and the welfare state.  As we 
explained above, globalization may cause a positive expansion of the welfare state, negative 
reduction, or possibly has no effect at all.  We model both dependent variables as functions 
of the fourth model in Table 2 and various globalization covariates, including one 
globalization indicator at a time.  Following our discussion, we differentiate globalization 
indicators into advantage, openness and threat.  For comparison, we also present the fit 
statistics from the fourth model of Table 2.  Coefficients for the baseline variables are not 
shown, but are available upon request. 
The models of government expenditure provide little evidence that globalization has either 
a positive or negative linear effect.  Twelve of the globalization covariates fail to reach 
significance, net of the baseline model.  Also, many of the signs of the insignificant 
coefficients seem to be inconsistent with any of the prior theories of globalization’s effects.  
Exports, a measure of globalization advantage, are negative, while imports, a measure of 
globalization threat, are positive.  Three of the measures of openness are negatively signed, 
while two are positively signed. 
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Table 3:  OLS-PCSE Models of Welfare State Measures on the Linear Effects of 
Globalization Indicators in Seventeen Developed Democracies, 1975-1998 
(N=380). 
 Government 
Expenditures 
 
R2 BIC′ 
 
Social Security 
Transfers 
R2 BIC′ 
 
Baseline Model  .764 -471.791  .548 -224.610 
Advantage       
Inward FDI as % of GDP 
 
-.269* 
(-1.81) 
.792 -513.337 -.196** 
(-2.38) 
.567 -234.729 
Inward PI as % of GDP 
 
.019 
(.48) 
.743 -433.284 .019 
(1.00) 
.551 -221.031 
Net Investment 
 
.045 
(1.27) 
.777 -487.059 .032 
(1.56) 
.555 -224.773 
Exports as % of GDP 
 
-.051 
(-1.18) 
.766 -469.250 -.022 
(-.90) 
.551 -220.693 
Net Trade 
 
-.169** 
(-2.55) 
.773 -479.635 -.029 
(-.77) 
.556 -224.944 
Net Globalization 
 
.004 
(.13) 
.764 -465.368 .022 
(1.20) 
.550 -220.186 
Openness       
FDI Openness 
 
-.232*** 
(-2.82) 
.778 -488.254 -.141*** 
(2.66) 
.560 -229.069 
Investment Openness 
 
-.013 
(-.60) 
.778 -488.938 -.778 
(-.70) 
.552 -222.218 
Trade Openness 
 
-.014 
(-.60) 
.765 -466.657 -.010 
(-.78) 
.550 -219.849 
Total Globalization 
 
-.012 
(-.82) 
.767 -469.738 -.008 
(-1.00) 
.551 
 
-220.947 
Capital Accounts 
Liberalization 
Index 
.615 
(1.44) 
.763 -464.082 .729*** 
(2.83) 
.554 -223.919 
Current Accounts 
Liberalization Index 
.291 
(1.24) 
.749 -441.961 .246** 
(1.97) 
.537 -209.038 
Threat       
Outward FDI as % of 
GDP 
-.333*** 
(-2.95) 
.770 -475.645 -.181** 
(-2.18) 
.559 -228.292 
Outward PI as % of GDP 
 
-.020 
(-.48) 
.787 -504.672 -.015 
(-.62) 
.559 -227.948 
Imports as % of GDP 
 
.002 
(.05) 
.764 -465.207 -.014 
(-.61) 
.549 -219.427 
Net Migration 
 
-.001 
(-.02) 
.779 -491.171 .019 
(.57) 
.555 -224.602 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-scores.  Models include the baseline control variables from the 
fourth model of Table 2 and a first-order serial autocorrelation correction.  All independent variables are 
lagged one year. 
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Only four measures are significantly associated with government expenditures, and two of 
these are in unexpected directions.  Inward FDI and net trade, presumably positive signs of 
globalization advantage, significantly reduce government expenditures.  At the same time, 
outward FDI, an indicator of globalization threat, has a significant negative effect.  FDI 
openness has a significant negative effect – which is unsurprising since it is the sum of 
inward and outward FDI (each significantly negative).  The fit statistics confirm that adding 
these globalization indicators to the baseline explains additional variation among welfare 
states. 
Models of social security transfers provide similar evidence.  Eleven of the globalization 
coefficients fail to reach significance.  Among the insignificant coefficients, two of the 
advantage measures are negative and three are positive.  All three of the openness measures 
are negative, and two of the threat measures are negative and one is positive.  Five 
indicators have significant effects.  As with government expenditures, inward and outward 
FDI and FDI openness have significant negative effects.  Unique to social security transfers, 
Quinn’s indices of capital and current accounts liberalization both have significant positive 
effects.  The models including the FDI variables improve model fit, while the models 
including Quinn’s indices are not preferred by BIC′. 
On the whole, these findings provide only limited evidence for either linear globalization 
theory.  What evidence exists seems to contradict a simple interpretation.  Both positive and 
negative effects appear, and these do not closely correspond with extant theory’s 
conceptions of globalization as advantage, openness or threat.  Moreover, eleven of the 
sixteen indicators of globalization – notably including both the total and net globalization 
summary measures – fail to have a significant effect for either dependent variable.  Thus, 
globalization has some precise effects with specific indicators, but globalization does not 
have a general linear relationship with the welfare state.  Examining many different 
globalization indicators allows us to detect findings that might have been overlooked with 
general measures of economic openness.  Without considering many different indicators, it 
is possible to have an incomplete or even mistaken understanding about the relationship 
between globalization and the welfare state.  
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4.3 Curvilinear Effects of Globalization 
If the evidence that globalization causes retrenchment is precise and limited, it may still 
have curvilinear effects.  One possible explanation for the null results above is that the 
effects of globalization may be nonlinear.  If the relationship between the welfare state and 
globalization takes an inverted U-shape, the globalization effect would be masked by the 
(mis-) specification of the linear model.  As we explained above, such a quadratic 
curvilinear relationship could provide evidence of welfare state convergence. 
Figure 3.  Variation in Two Welfare State Measures Across 17 Affluent 
Democracies, 1975-1998
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Before examining such curvilinear effects, we present the descriptive patterns in welfare 
state variation across affluent democracies.  Figure 3 displays the coefficients of variation 
for the two welfare state measures from 1975 to 1998.  During the globalization era, 
government expenditures actually diverged sharply from a coefficient of variation of .17 in 
1975 to .24 in 1983.  After that point, government expenditures slowly and slightly 
converged to .19 in 1998 – the lowest point since 1977.  Social security transfers slightly 
diverged from .32 in 1975 to about .35 from 1979 to 1981.  After that, social security 
transfers fluctuated until it reached .33 in 1990.  Since then, there has been a significant 
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convergence to .25 in 1998.  Some of these patterns should be read with caution, since we 
add Japan, Switzerland, and Ireland to the sample in 1978, 1984 and 1991.  Nevertheless, 
sizable convergence in social security transfers occurred at least after 1991, while 
government expenditures showed more modest convergence. 
Table 4 shows results for government expenditures where each globalization covariate 
enters the model with a quadratic specification.18  For nine of the sixteen globalization 
indicators, both main and squared terms are insignificant.  Only in the model for net trade 
are both the globalization indicator and its square significant.  Both terms are negative, with 
the squared term smaller in magnitude.  As countries export more and import less, 
government expenditures initially decline steeply and subsequently decline modestly.  
Exports, trade openness, and net migration have significant negative effects only in the 
squared term, but are not significant in the main term.  This suggests that government 
expenditures decline only at high levels of exports, trade openness and net migration.  
Consistent with Table 3, FDI openness has a negative effect in the main term.  When 
coefficients are significant, model fit improves.  For example, BIC′ very strongly prefers the 
models with net trade and its square over the baseline model. Despite these findings, no 
globalization indicator has the expected curvilinear relationship of positive and negative 
effects that would suggest convergence.  Exports, trade openness, and imports have such 
positive and negative effects with t-scores greater than 1.0 for both.  However, both terms 
fail to reach significance. 
                                                   
18 A common concern with the quadratic specification is that collinearity between a variable and its 
square can inflate the standard errors of both coefficients.  In all but a few models, Wald joint 
significance tests are not significant. 
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Table 4: OLS-PCSE Models of Welfare State Measures on the Curvilinear Effects of 
Globalization in Seventeen Developed Democracies, 1975-1998 (N=380). 
 
 Government  
Expenditures 
R2 BIC′ 
 
Social Security  
Transfers 
R2 BIC′ 
 
Baseline Model  .764 -471.791  .548 -224.610 
Advantage       
Inward FDI as % of GDP 
 
-.250 
(-.90) 
.794 -511.804 -.222 
(-1.52) 
.573 -234.623 
Inward FDI as % of GDP2 
 
-.005 
(-.09) 
  .005 
(.16) 
  
Inward PI as % of GDP 
 
.039 
(.72) 
.781 -487.304 .027 
(1.01) 
.557 -220.031 
Inward PI as % of GDP2 
 
-.002 
(-.61) 
  -.001 
(-.66) 
  
Net Investment 
 
.045 
(1.18) 
.782 -489.040 .032* 
(1.65) 
.561 -223.994 
Net Investment2 
 
-.001 
(-.10) 
  .001 
(.16) 
  
Exports as % of GDP 
 
.123 
(1.19) 
.785 -494.472 .090 
(1.38) 
.570 -231.253 
Exports as % of GDP2 
 
-.002* 
(-1.90) 
  -.001* 
(-1.71) 
  
Net Trade 
 
-.152** 
(-2.33) 
.790 -503.040 -.016 
(-.43) 
.571 -232.579 
Net Trade2 
 
-.015* 
(-1.69) 
  -.010** 
(-1.97) 
  
Net Globalization 
 
.008 
(.24) 
.790 -503.944 .019 
(.92) 
.563 -225.557 
Net Globalization2 
 
-.0004 
(-.10) 
  .001 
(.55) 
  
Openness       
FDI Openness 
 
-.355* 
(-1.89) 
.782 -490.260 -.158 
(-1.30) 
.566 -227.825 
FDI Openness2 
 
.013 
(.75) 
  .002 
(.14) 
  
Investment Openness 
 
-.022 
(-.54) 
.779 -484.715 -.011 
(-.56) 
.554 -217.808 
Investment Openness2 
 
.0002 
(.31) 
  .0001 
(.30) 
  
Trade Openness 
 
.069 
(1.29) 
.783 -490.958 .045 
(1.39) 
.571 -232.225 
Trade Openness2 
 
-.0005* 
(-1.74) 
  -.0003 
(-1.64) 
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Table 4 continued 
Total Globalization 
 
.016 
(.49) 
.781 -487.997 .003 
(.15) 
.561 -223.562 
Total Globalization 
Total Globalization2 
-.0001 
-.0001 
(-.94) 
  -.00 
-.0005 
(-.67) 
  
Threat       
Outward FDI as % of GDP 
 
-.450 
(-1.56) 
.768 -466.740 -.113 
(-.55) 
.563 -225.470 
Outward FDI as % of GDP2 
 
.020 
(.43) 
  -.011 
(-.30) 
  
Outward PI as % of GDP 
 
-.033 
(-.50) 
.788 -500.162 -.023 
(-.56) 
.560 -222.956 
Outward PI as % of GDP2 
 
.001 
(.29) 
  .0004 
(.33) 
  
Imports as % of GDP 
 
.139 
(1.44) 
.783 -491.659 .078 
(1.34) 
.571 -232.491 
Imports as % of GDP2 
 
-.002 
(-1.56) 
  -.001 
(-1.51) 
  
Net Migration 
 
.121 
(1.38) 
.784 -492.887 .101** 
(2.21) 
.566 -227.650 
Net Migration2 
 
-.011** 
(-2.41) 
  -.007*** 
(-3.17) 
  
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are t-scores.  Models include the baseline control variables from the 
fourth model of Table 2 and a first-order serial autocorrelation correction.  All independent variables are 
lagged one year. 
Table 4 also shows the results for social security transfers.  For ten of the sixteen 
globalization indicators, both the main and squared term are insignificant.  The net 
investment main term is barely significantly positive (t=1.65), while its squared term is 
insignificant.  But, BIC′ does not prefer this model over the baseline.  Exports and net trade 
are significant for the squared but not the main term.  At higher levels, exports and net trade 
are associated with declining social security transfers.  Net migration is significantly 
positive in the main term, and significantly negative in the squared term.  Thus, this variable 
alone has a positive and negative curvilinear effect that suggests globalization causes 
convergence.  Exports, trade openness, and imports are positive in the main term and 
negative in the squared term.  Though near significant, one or both of these coefficients fails 
to reach significance.  Importantly, the non-findings on trade openness (for both dependent 
variables) contrast with recent research that found curvilinear effects (Garrett 1998a; Hicks 
1999). 
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4.4 Final Models 
In Table 5, we present final models for the two dependent variables.  Rather than throwing 
together all significant coefficients from Tables 3 and 4, we selectively include the most 
important globalization variables.  With the baseline, we now include two measures of 
advantage: net trade and net trade squared; two measures of openness: FDI openness and 
the capital accounts liberalization index; and a curvilinear specification of globalization 
threat: net migration and net migration squared.  In analyses not shown, we considered the 
collinearity and redundancy among these and other variables.  This selection of measures 
represents the optimal specification of globalization’s effects.  In Table 5, we now also 
present the standardized coefficients.19 
Focusing on the first models for both dependent variables, all of the included globalization 
indicators are significant.  Comparing these results with Tables 3 and 4, the effects are 
generally robust – thus including the globalization indicators together does not bias their 
effects.  The only departures are for government expenditures.  Now, and like social 
security transfers, the capital accounts liberalization index is significantly positive, and net 
migration has a significant curvilinear (positive and negative) effect.  The baseline controls 
are consistent with the fourth model in Table 2, though some variables are now significant 
that were not before: female labor force participation, unemployment and labor power for 
government expenditures; and constitutional structure, voter turnout, and manufacturing and 
agricultural employment for social security transfers.  For one or both models, a few 
controls are insignificant, but the models would not appreciably improve with their 
omission.  BIC′ very strongly prefers these models over any of the models in the prior 
tables. 
Net trade, despite being a measure of globalization advantage, constrains the welfare state 
(in the main and squared term for government expenditures and in the squared term for 
social security transfers).  One measure of globalization openness, FDI openness decreases 
both dependent variables, while the other, capital accounts liberalization, increases both.  
                                                   
19 One of the omissions we have noticed in the welfare state literature is that most quantitative studies do 
not discuss the magnitude of effects.  Typically, authors solely concentrate on statistical significance 
and neglect substantive significance.  Most studies do not calculate standardized coefficients, though a 
few offer substantive representations of the effects of key variables (Burgoon 2001).  To make claims 
about the relative evidence for various theories, it is essential to assess the substantive, and not only 
statistical, significance displayed by standardized coefficients. 
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Net migration, a measure of globalization threat, has a positive turning negative curvilinear 
effect, possibly suggesting convergence.  On the one hand, these coefficients provide 
support for all three of the theories of globalization’s effects.  In fact, globalization appears 
to have positive, negative and curvilinear effects.  On the other hand, the advantage, 
openness and threat measures do not appear to have effects consistent with the three 
theories.  Also, since these theories contrast with each other (and evidence for one 
contradicts the others), it is difficult to claim that any theory is truly supported.  
Nevertheless, since globalization does affect the welfare state, these results contrast with 
previous claims that globalization is an insignificant influence. 
These globalization effects are statistically significant, but relatively small.  For government 
expenditures, all the globalization standardized coefficients are less than .1 in absolute 
value.  Summing the absolute values of all six indicators, their cumulative effect is smaller 
than the effect of manufacturing and agricultural employment.  This supports Iversen and 
Cusack’s (2000) argument that deindustrialization was more important than globalization in 
explaining welfare state variation.  Also, many control variables have larger effects than any 
one globalization indicator: right power, authoritarian legacy, GDP per capita, constitutional 
structure, elderly population, labor power, military spending, and unemployment (in order 
of magnitude).  Despite globalization’s significance, other causes have the most influence 
on government expenditures. 
With the exception of net trade’s main term, the effects of globalization are larger for social 
security transfers than for government expenditures.  But, the effects remain relatively 
small.  Only the capital accounts liberalization index has a standardized coefficient larger 
than an absolute value of .1.  Again, many controls have larger effects than any 
globalization indicator: GDP per capita, year, labor power, manufacturing and agricultural 
employment, elderly population, constitutional structure, and authoritarian legacy (in order 
of magnitude).  Non-globalization causes have the greatest impact on social security 
transfers as well.20   
                                                   
20 Some other analyses warrant mention.  Many scholars place the peak and onset of decline of the 
welfare state in the early 1980s.  Though a later peak occurs in 1993 (see Figure 2), we estimated our 
final models for only 1984-1998 to see if globalization had more powerful negative effects.  For 
government expenditures, capital accounts liberalization has a larger, more significant effect, net 
trade’s main term is now insignificant and net migration’s main term is larger and more significant.  
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Table 5 provides evidence for and against several welfare state theories.  Consistent with 
new politics accounts, constitutional structure constrains while the size of the elderly 
population expands the welfare state.  Consistent with the politics-as-usual (partisan and 
class politics) account, voter turnout, authoritarian legacy, labor power and right cabinet 
affect welfare states.  Consistent with Iversen and Cusack (2000), deindustrialization 
triggers welfare state expansion.  Also, there are some surprising results that do not clearly 
mesh with prior welfare state theories (i.e. female labor force participation -, GDP per 
capita -, unemployment -, and military spending +).  These results suggest the continuing 
importance of flexibility and caution in theorizing the welfare state, and the reality that 
some variables have different effects in the more recent historical period.  Ultimately, the 
results in Table 5 confirm the need for synthetic welfare state models that incorporate 
causal variables from multiple theories. 
One obvious concern with the first models in Table 5 is that the controls might mediate 
globalization’s effects.  We might be obscuring globalization’s indirect effects by including 
certain controls in the same models.  The two most likely potential mediating controls are 
manufacturing and agricultural employment and labor power.  If globalization contributes 
to deindustrialization and declining labor power, and since those two variables affect the 
welfare state, globalization might have indirect effects.21  In Table 5’s second models, we 
estimate reduced form models where we omit those two.  Importantly, however, the second 
reduced form models do not provide evidence of greater globalization effects.  Mostly, the 
effects of globalization indicators are similar in size and significance.  Net trade and net 
migration do not affect the two welfare state measures in the reduced form models.  Hence, 
                                                                                                                                                     
For social security transfers, larger, more significant effects occur for net trade’s square and capital 
accounts liberalization.  With the exception of net trade for transfers, globalization does not have more 
powerful negative effects in the 1984-1998 period.  Most  results are robust if Ireland, Japan and 
Switzerland are omitted.  None of the effects is different if Japan or Switzerland is dropped.  If Ireland 
is dropped, nothing changes for social security transfers, but net trade’s square is insignificant for 
government expenditures.  If all three are dropped, net trade and its square are insignificant for social 
security transfers and net trade’s square is insignificant for government expenditures. 
21 We appreciate that studies fail to provide much evidence that globalization actually has large causal 
effects on deindustrialization (Alderson 1999) and labor power (Scruggs and Lange 2002).  But, we are 
trying to give the globalization effect the best opportunity to reach significance.  We recognize that the 
logic of indirect effects may be problematic since globalization would be presumed to reduce both 
manufacturing and agricultural employment and labor power, while those two have direct effects on the 
welfare state in opposite directions.   
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these second models provide no evidence that globalization’s effects operate indirectly 
through manufacturing and agricultural employment and labor power. 
Table 5: Final OLS-PCSE Models of Welfare State Measures in Seventeen Developed 
Democracies, 1975-1998 (N=380). 
 
 Government Expenditures Social Security Transfers 
Net Trade 
 
-.159** 
-.053 
(-2.40) 
-.086 
-.029 
(-1.20) 
-.028 
-.019 
(-.74) 
-.003 
-.002 
(-.07) 
Net Trade2 
 
 
-.020** 
-.044 
(-2.12) 
-.027*** 
-.061 
(-2.71) 
-.013** 
-.056 
(-2.41) 
-.012** 
-.053 
(-2.26) 
FDI Openness 
 
-.214** 
-.051 
(-2.52) 
-.179* 
-.043 
(-1.84) 
-.136** 
-.066 
(-2.47) 
-.140** 
-.068 
(-2.51) 
Capital Accounts 
Liberalization Index 
 
1.029** 
.079 
(2.25) 
1.031** 
.080 
(1.99) 
1.030*** 
.160 
(3.68) 
.870*** 
.136 
(2.96) 
Net Migration 
 
.152* 
.045 
(1.75) 
.155 
.046 
(1.61) 
.111** 
.067 
(2.32) 
.107** 
.065 
(2.27) 
Net Migration2 
 
 
-.011** 
-.035 
(-2.38) 
-.008* 
-.025 
(-1.77) 
-.008*** 
-.048 
(-3.04) 
-.007*** 
-.043 
(-3.03) 
Constitutional 
Structure 
 
-.891*** 
-.206 
(-3.46) 
-1.364*** 
-.316 
(-5.04) 
-.372** 
-.174 
(-2.02) 
-.506*** 
-.236 
(-2.60) 
Female Labor Force 
Participation 
 
-.097* 
-.043 
(-1.83) 
.028 
.012 
(.58) 
-.136*** 
-.122 
(-3.43) 
-.081** 
-.073 
(-2.18) 
Voter Turnout 
 
.002 
.002 
(.06) 
.067** 
.093 
(2.56) 
-.045** 
-.128 
(-2.25) 
-.027 
-.076 
(-1.45) 
Elderly Population 
 
 
.874*** 
.206 
(3.05) 
.641*** 
.151 
(2.62) 
.497*** 
.237 
(3.26) 
.556*** 
.268 
(3.25) 
Authoritarian Legacy 
 
 
2.847*** 
.268 
(4.95) 
1.208*** 
.114 
(2.70) 
.859** 
.163 
(2.45) 
.656** 
.125 
(2.20) 
GDP Per Capita 
 
-.001*** 
-.253 
(-2.82) 
-.0002 
-.056 
(-.64) 
-.0004*** 
-.297 
(-2.88) 
-.0003** 
-.218 
(-2.14) 
Year 
 
 
.087 
.066 
(.56) 
.269* 
.205 
(1.72) 
.173** 
.265 
(2.12) 
.195 
.299 
(2.25) 
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Table 5 continued 
Inflation 
 
 
.063 
.030 
(1.02) 
.025 
.012 
(.39) 
.002 
.002 
(.07) 
-.003 
-.003 
(-.11) 
Unemployment 
 
-.266* 
-.102 
(-1.85) 
.274** 
.104 
(2.14) 
-.096 
-.074 
(-1.12) 
.023 
.017 
(.31) 
Military Spending 
 
.829** 
.111 
(2.18) 
1.628*** 
.217 
(4.54) 
.495** 
.134 
(2.43) 
.553** 
.149 
(2.57) 
Mfg. & Agric. 
Employment 
 
-.712*** 
-.559 
(-6.10) 
 -.155** 
-.246 
(-2.33) 
 
Labor Power 
 
 
.043* 
.134 
(1.92) 
 .041*** 
.253 
(3.51) 
 
Right Cabinet 
 
 
-.232*** 
-.296 
(-4.35) 
-.301*** 
-.385 
(-6.26) 
-.053** 
-.138 
(-2.10) 
-.096*** 
-.248 
(-4.10) 
Constant 
 
69.806*** 
(7.58) 
24.776*** 
(4.39) 
25.767*** 
(4.32) 
14.889*** 
(4.28) 
R2 .811 .787 .608 .590 
BIC′ -520.019 -486.673 -242.520 -238.195 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: Each cell contains the unstandardized coefficient, the standardized coefficient in bold and italics, 
and the t-scores in parentheses.  Models include a first-order serial autocorrelation correction.  All 
independent variables are lagged one year. 
4.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
In Table 6, we decompose the full sample into European and non-European countries and 
liberal/uncoordinated and non-liberal/coordinated regimes.22  Previous studies have 
contended that globalization is most important to the welfare state in either European 
countries or liberal regimes.  Given the small number of cases and varying descriptive 
statistics (complicating comparisons of coefficients) across our sub-samples, these results 
should be read with caution.  Several controls occasionally have significant effects in 
different and unexpected directions.  This suggests the instability of coefficients and effects 
upon decomposing the sample into smaller sub-samples.  
                                                   
22 We code Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States as 
liberal/uncoordinated. 
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Table 6:  Sensitivity Analyses Decomposing Sample for Final OLS-PCSE Models 
 
 Government Expenditures Social Security Transfers 
 European Non-
European 
Liberal Non-
Liberal 
European Non-
European 
Liberal Non-
Liberal 
Net Trade 
 
-.146** 
(-2.00) 
-.509*** 
(-3.46) 
-.337** 
(-2.38) 
-.210*** 
(-2.66) 
-.022 
(-.52) 
.002 
(.02) 
-.017 
(-.36) 
-.070 
(-1.48) 
Net Trade2 
 
-.020** 
(-2.15) 
.051 
(1.01) 
-.008 
(-.47) 
-.015 
(-1.34) 
-.015*** 
(-2.92) 
-.005 
(-.24) 
-.017*** 
(-3.15) 
-.008 
(-1.18) 
FDI Openness -.231** 
(-2.56) 
-1.094*** 
(-4.97) 
-1.090*** 
(-5.88) 
-.123 
(-1.29) 
-.147** 
(-2.36) 
-.415*** 
(-4.44) 
-.490*** 
(-7.06) 
-.057 
(-.89) 
Capital 
Accounts 
Liberalization 
Index 
.682 
(1.32) 
3.337*** 
(3.31) 
.208 
(.35) 
1.965*** 
(3.34) 
.954*** 
(2.99) 
.580 
(1.23) 
.495** 
(2.41) 
2.146*** 
(5.55) 
Net Migration 
 
.236** 
(2.34) 
.034 
(.11) 
-.078 
(-.45) 
.403*** 
(3.49 
.182*** 
(2.95) 
-.036 
(-.27) 
.050 
(.80) 
.291*** 
(3.84) 
Net Migration2 
 
-.017*** 
(-3.15) 
-.005 
(-.20) 
.011 
(.61) 
-.023*** 
(-3.82) 
-.011*** 
(-3.63) 
.001 
(.11) 
-.004 
(-.70) 
-.016*** 
(-3.86) 
Constitutional  
Structure 
-.699** 
(-2.20) 
-2.661*** 
(-2.77) 
-4.598*** 
(-4.27) 
-1.112*** 
(-3.44) 
-.084 
(-.43) 
1.535*** 
(3.33) 
.537 
(1.44) 
-.690*** 
(-3.30) 
Female Labor  
Force Part. 
-.179*** 
(-3.48) 
.590*** 
(4.47) 
.103 
(.75) 
-.090* 
(-1.69) 
-.164*** 
(-4.34) 
.143** 
(2.28) 
.127*** 
(2.60) 
-.113*** 
(-3.13) 
Voter Turnout 
 
-.019 
(-.44) 
-.172*** 
(-2.81) 
-.179*** 
(-2.64) 
-.041 
(-.92) 
-.012 
(-.41) 
-.050* 
(-1.67) 
-.067*** 
(-2.62) 
-.077** 
(-2.54) 
Elderly 
Population 
.339 
(1.08) 
-.493 
(-.97) 
2.922*** 
(3.30) 
.988*** 
(3.13) 
-.263 
(-1.14) 
-.278 
(-.98) 
.271 
(.96) 
.279 
(1.56) 
Authoritarian  
Legacy 
4.416*** 
(6.31) 
-9.283*** 
(-3.43) 
-23.590*** 
(-3.71) 
3.575*** 
(5.92) 
1.430*** 
(3.20) 
.986 
(.77) 
4.047* 
(1.92) 
1.027*** 
(3.14) 
GDP Per Capita 
 
-.001* 
(-1.81) 
-.001*** 
(-3.95) 
-.0005 
(-1.36) 
-.001*** 
(-3.86) 
-.0003* 
(-1.80) 
-.001*** 
(-5.54) 
-.0005*** 
(-3.96) 
-.001*** 
(-4.52) 
Year 
 
-.033 
(-.21) 
.686** 
(2.43) 
.149 
(.85) 
.040 
(.27) 
.060 
(.69) 
.477*** 
(3.74) 
.177*** 
(3.07) 
.168** 
(2.12) 
Inflation 
 
.068 
(.98) 
.092 
(.91) 
.153* 
(1.74) 
.053 
(.66) 
-.002 
(-.06) 
.006 
(.13) 
.036 
(1.11) 
-.037 
(-.85) 
Unemployment 
 
-.360** 
(-2.25) 
.695** 
(1.97) 
.062 
(.25) 
-.262 
(-1.55) 
-.169* 
(-1.73) 
-.155 
(-.99) 
-.060 
(-.73) 
-.118 
(-1.26) 
Military 
Spending 
1.348** 
(2.40) 
-.255 
(-.41) 
.550 
(1.01) 
1.659*** 
(2.90) 
.440 
(1.46) 
-.580** 
(-2.01) 
-.558*** 
(-2.69) 
.955*** 
(3.05) 
Mfg. & Agric.  
Employment 
-.938*** 
(-7.33) 
.942** 
(2.14) 
-.036 
(-.15) 
-.910*** 
(-7.35) 
-.345*** 
(-4.16) 
.085 
(.44) 
-.070 
(-.83) 
-.259*** 
(-4.03) 
Labor Power 
 
.102*** 
(4.22) 
-.042 
(-.40) 
.030 
(.31) 
.046* 
(1.76) 
.075*** 
(5.13) 
-.033 
(-.68) 
-.069** 
(-1.97) 
.026* 
(1.68) 
Right Cabinet 
 
.012 
(.18) 
-.194* 
(-1.75) 
-.376*** 
(-4.12) 
-.092* 
(-1.83) 
.104*** 
(2.88) 
-.111** 
(-2.09) 
-.034 
(-1.08) 
.004 
(.14) 
Constant 
 
83.095*** 
(7.51) 
23.876 
(1.15) 
78.771*** 
(4.97) 
80.258*** 
(7.47) 
38.369*** 
(4.96) 
11.723 
(1.26) 
9.830 
(1.63) 
38.821*** 
(5.72) 
R2 .814 .918 .898 .816 .591 .840 .922 .635 
BIC′ -374.590 -146.818 -522.720 -87.528 -148.709 -84.136 -596.242 -16.460 
N 287 93 276 104 287 93 276 104 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: Each cell contains an unstandardized coefficient and t-score in parantheses.  Models include a 
first-order serial autocorrelation correction.  All independent variables are lagged one year. 
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These results provide little support that globalization has fundamentally different 
consequences across these sub-samples.  Though some differences appear across sub-
samples, there is no consistent pattern in globalization’s effects.  Net trade squared 
significantly reduces government expenditures in European countries, significantly reduces 
social security transfers in European and liberal regimes, but is not significant in the other 
models.  FDI openness significantly reduces both dependent variables in liberal regimes and 
in European and non-European countries, but is insignificant in non-liberal regimes.  
Capital accounts liberalization significantly increases government expenditures in non-
European countries and non-liberal regimes, but significantly increases social security 
transfers in European countries and both liberal and non-liberal regimes.  For both 
dependent variables, net migration and its square have significant positive and negative 
effects in European countries and non-liberal regimes.  Several variables are significant 
across sub-samples and dependent variables, while some are now insignificant after 
decomposition.  Ultimately, the effects of some globalization indicators appear to be 
sensitive to sample decomposition, but our results do not support claims that globalization 
consistently matters most (or only) in liberal regimes or European countries. 
Finally, in Table 7, we present analyses of four alternative dependent variables.  We will 
not discuss all of the coefficients, though interestingly, several key control variables are 
occasionally insignificant.  Our purpose is merely to confirm that globalization does not 
have fundamentally different effects on alternative dependent variables.  When significant, 
the globalization variables are in the same direction as in previous tables.  Net migration 
and its square have a positive and negative curvilinear effect on government revenue.  Four 
of the six globalization variables significantly affect social welfare expenditures: net trade 
and its square are negative, FDI openness is negative and capital accounts liberalization is 
positive.  At the same time, each of the globalization coefficients is not significant for three 
of the four dependent variables.  Hence, Table 7 provides less evidence that globalization is 
a crucial influence on welfare states.  Globalization’s effects are more limited for these 
alternative dependent variables. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analyses of Alternative Dependent Variables for Final OLS-PCSE 
Models 
 
 Government 
Revenue as % 
of GDP 
Social Welfare 
Expend. as % of 
GDP 
Public Employment 
as a % of Civilian 
Employment 
Public Health 
Spending as % of 
Health Spending 
Net Trade 
 
-.063 
(-1.14) 
-.151** 
(-2.27) 
.025 
(1.12) 
.016 
(.19) 
Net Trade2 
 
-.005 
(-.65) 
-.017* 
(-1.93) 
.002 
(.55) 
-.0001 
(-.01) 
FDI Openness 
 
.028 
(.38) 
-.104* 
(-1.80) 
-.019 
(-.73) 
.118 
(1.22) 
Capital Accounts 
Liberalization 
Index 
.424 
(1.08) 
.967*** 
(3.14) 
-.147 
(-1.15) 
-.448 
(-.80) 
Net Migration 
 
.143** 
(1.98) 
.054 
(.77) 
.018 
(.73) 
.148 
(1.53) 
Net Migration2 
 
-.013*** 
(-2.83) 
.001 
(.37) 
-.001 
(-.66) 
-.002 
(-.39) 
Constitutional 
Structure 
-1.076*** 
(-4.43) 
-.634*** 
(-3.42) 
-.303*** 
(-3.12) 
-3.036*** 
(-7.13) 
Female Labor 
Force 
Participation 
.033 
(.67) 
-.003 
(-.09) 
.214*** 
(9.87) 
.217*** 
(3.01) 
Voter Turnout 
 
.009 
(.37) 
-.047** 
(-2.05) 
.023** 
(2.10) 
.127*** 
(2.82) 
Elderly 
Population 
1.231*** 
(6.05) 
1.005*** 
(5.05) 
.472*** 
(5.57) 
1.144*** 
(3.18) 
Authoritarian 
Legacy 
.332 
(.65) 
.635 
(1.32) 
-.196 
(-.96) 
.174 
(.23) 
GDP Per Capita -.0002 
(-1.40) 
-.001*** 
(-3.19 
.0001* 
(1.70) 
-.001** 
(-2.56) 
Year 
 
-.022 
(-.21) 
.284*** 
(2.60) 
-.182*** 
(-4.17) 
-.200 
(-1.31) 
Inflation 
 
-.049 
(-1.15) 
.048 
(.96) 
.009 
(.75) 
.062 
(1.24) 
Unemployment -.233** 
(-1.96) 
-.054 
(-.58) 
-.072* 
(-1.87) 
-.024 
(-.16) 
Military 
Spending 
-.053 
(-.19) 
-.019 
(-.07) 
.091 
(.67) 
-.600 
(-1.16) 
Mfg. & Agric. 
Employment 
-.321*** 
(-3.89) 
-.255*** 
(-3.24) 
-.166*** 
(-5.12) 
-.038 
(-.33) 
Labor Power 
 
.042** 
(2.45) 
.042*** 
(2.85) 
.008 
(1.05) 
-.024 
(-.87) 
Right Cabinet 
 
-.236*** 
(-5.85) 
-.104*** 
(-3.77) 
-.113*** 
(-7.07) 
.041 
(.71) 
Constant 
 
44.575*** 
(6.02) 
26.183*** 
(3.96) 
.245 
(.09) 
64.966*** 
(7.11) 
R2 .489 .811 .776 .902 
BIC′ -604.261 -382.285 -437.658 -771.350 
N 380 294 368 380 
*** p<.01 ** p<.05  *p<.10 
Notes: Each cell contains an unstandardized coefficient and t-score in parentheses.  Models include a 
first-order serial autocorrelation correction.  All independent variables are lagged one year. 
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5 Discussion 
Our study comprehensively examines the consequences of economic globalization for the 
welfare state.  We now review the evidence for the aforementioned theories.  First, we 
provide evidence that some globalization indicators cause an expansion in the welfare state.  
Most influentially, Quinn’s (1997) index of capital accounts liberalization index triggers an 
expansion of the welfare state (as well as current accounts liberalization).  Countries that are 
more legally open to international economic transactions tend to have more extensive 
welfare states.  Also, net migration (in the main term) initially causes an expansion of the 
welfare state. 
Second, we provide evidence that globalization causes a welfare state reduction.  However, 
we are skeptical that globalization generally causes a welfare state crisis, and it is unlikely 
that language of crisis is the best way to frame recent welfare state trends.  While the 
affluent democracies clearly experienced increasing globalization, government expenditures 
and social security transfers were remarkably stable.  Nevertheless, several globalization 
indicators have significant negative effects.  Net trade (at least in the squared term), FDI 
openness, and net migration squared all cause welfare state reductions.  Since net trade has 
been relatively constant over time, and FDI openness and net migration have been rising, 
our study provides evidence that globalization is actually causing modest welfare state 
retrenchment.  At the same time, globalization is probably not responsible for massive 
retrenchment or crisis since the effects are quite small. 
Third, our study provides limited evidence that globalization has curvilinear effects or that 
globalization triggers welfare state convergence.  Our study contradicts recent studies that 
found that trade and investment openness have curvilinear (positive and negative) effects on 
social welfare expenditures (Garrett 1998a; Hicks 1999).  The only variable that has the 
expected positive and negative curvilinear effects is net migration.  Given our concerns with 
how net migration is measured (see footnote 15), this conclusion should be taken with 
caution. 
Fourth, given globalization’s significant effects, it seems premature to dismiss 
globalization’s influence.  Unlike the many skeptics, we find that globalization does matter.  
Also, since most globalization indicators do not significantly affect the welfare state, our 
study illustrates the necessity of scrutinizing many different facets of globalization.  Relying 
on previously established summary measures like trade openness may lead to an incomplete 
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or inaccurate view of how globalization affects the welfare state.  One of the reasons that 
many might have dismissed globalization is that they failed to dig deeply enough into the 
different indicators and measurements of globalization.  Nevertheless, our conclusion that 
globalization has relatively small effects suggests that other welfare state theories probably 
are more useful.23 
Ultimately, we provide evidence for each of the theories of globalization’s consequences for 
the welfare state: positive, negative, curvilinear and insignificant.  This is surprising given 
that these theories seemed irreconcilable.  How can one interpret such varying effects for 
globalization?  We offer two interpretations.  First, different globalization indicators may 
have contrasting effects since globalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon that may 
actually have contradictory or offsetting consequences in its various dimensions (Guillén 
2001).  Thus, when scholars argue that globalization has certain effects on the welfare state, 
it is essential to be specific about which aspects of globalization have which effects.  
Simply put, distinct globalization indicators appear to have distinct effects for the welfare 
state.  Second, different globalization indicators may have contrasting effects because states 
anticipate the consequences of globalization.  For example, FDI openness has negative 
effects while capital accounts liberalization has positive effects.  Potentially, states raise 
social spending at the same time they liberalize capital accounts as anticipatory 
compensation (Garrett 1998a), and then when FDI increases, states are forced to contract 
the welfare state.  Capital accounts and current accounts liberalization appear to have the 
only unambiguously linear positive effects, and most other significant globalization effects 
are negative.  There appears to be a difference between the effects of state policies to 
globalize the economy and the effects of actual increased international economic exchange. 
In addition to scrutinizing globalization, our study contributes to broader welfare state 
debates.  As analysts of earlier periods recognized (Huber and Stephens 2001a; Hicks 
1999), welfare state models warrant revision in the post-development globalization era.  
The core party variables of Huber and Stephens’ power constellations approach are not 
significant, especially after controlling for deindustrialization and labor power.  Like the 
new politics account, we find that constitutional structure and the size of the elderly 
                                                   
23 Also, our results provide little evidence that effects of globalization are systematically and consistently 
different or only important in liberal/uncoordinated regimes or European countries. 
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population have substantial influence on welfare state variation.  At the same time, 
consistent with the politics-as-usual view, we find that class politics continue to exert 
tremendous pressure on welfare states.  Unlike Huber and Stephens (2000, 2001a) and 
Pierson (1994, 1996), we find that partisan differences remain salient for the welfare state in 
the globalization era.  Like Allan and Scruggs (2004), we find that it is now right cabinet, 
not left or Christian Democrat, that influences welfare state variation.  Finally, we partially 
support Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) conclusion that deindustrialization has a crucial impact 
on the welfare state, one that is more important than globalization.  Yet, we find that 
deindustrialization is more important for government expenditures than social security 
transfers.  Ultimately, our study provides evidence for several welfare state theories.  
Synthetic, multi-causal models remain the best way to explain the welfare state. 
This study suggests the need for future research in at least two directions.  First, scholars 
should continue to explore alternative measures of the welfare state.  Most of the past 
literature – including studies claiming globalization effects – has relied on these general 
measures.  To engage the debates in the existing literature, it remains valuable to analyze 
government expenditures and social security transfers.  Furthermore, our sensitivity 
analyses reveal that globalization has similar, if less robust, effects for alternative dependent 
variables.24  Ultimately, however, we appreciate that these two general measures are not 
perfect measures of the welfare state.  To our knowledge, a similar comprehensive study of 
globalization’s effects has not been done with recent alternative measures.  It may even be 
worthwhile to analyze the effects of globalization on a more broadly conceptualized welfare 
state, including “private” social benefits (Hacker 2002; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001).  We 
encourage the further study of alternative welfare state measures, though as of yet, most 
novel alternatives are not publicly available. 
Second, case studies continue to provide another valuable direction.  Scholars would 
enhance the understanding of globalization by analyzing the local politics within individual 
welfare states.  Such case studies might facilitate the study of other aspects (i.e. political, 
legal, and cultural) of globalization and the interconnections between domestic politics and 
                                                   
24 Moreover, research suggests that among welfare state measures, government expenditures and social 
security transfers have some of the most powerful effects on inequality and poverty (Bradley et al. 
2003; Brady 2003; Moller et al. 2003).  To our knowledge, by contrast, proponents of novel 
alternatives have not demonstrated greater predictive validity for inequality and poverty. 
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globalization.  Blyth (2002), for example, demonstrates that Swedish policymakers socially 
constructed globalization and the need to be internationally competitive as inevitable forces 
that necessitate welfare state retrenchment and privatization.  Even though “actual” 
globalization has modest effects, it may still operate as a socially constructed political tool 
facilitating welfare state change (Cox 2001; Schmidt 2002; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001).  One 
byproduct of our analyses is that there may be some interesting, but unexplored, dynamics 
within Ireland, Japan, and the Netherlands.  Generally, welfare states maintained stable 
spending levels during this period of rising globalization.  However, in Ireland and the 
Netherlands social security transfers notably contracted as their economies became even 
more globalized in the 1990s.  Japan reduced social security transfers as it actually became 
less globalized.  We encourage others to explore how globalization is shaping welfare states 
in these and other case studies. 
 In sum, our study provides new evidence on the relationship between globalization 
and the welfare state in the globalization era.  Most importantly, globalization does not have 
one overall effect on the welfare state: different facets of globalization have different 
effects, in different directions.  We suggest globalization does matter, just not as much as 
political and other economic causes of welfare state variation.  We encourage more research 
on globalization, but suggest a more precise, refined and nuanced understanding of how 
globalization shapes the welfare state. 
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Appendix I:  Correlation Matrix for Main Variables in Analyses (N=380). 
 
Panel A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1) Govt. Exp.                  
2) Social Sec. 
Transfers 
.83                 
3) Left Cabinet .52 .37                
4) C.D. Cabinet .27 .42 .02               
5) Union Density .49 .24 .65 -.15              
6) Const. Structure -.59 -.50 -.56 -.26 -.63             
7) Female Labor  
Force Part. 
.07 -.12 .50 -.18 .28 .01            
8) F.L.F.P.*  
Left Party 
.19 .14 .25 .10 .24 -.28 .03           
9) Voter Turnout .44 .26 .36 .06 .49 -.52 -.27 .17          
10) Elderly  
Population 
.51 .47 .69 -.06 .39 -.38 .35 .09 .19         
11) Strikes -.01 .00 .05 .04 .10 -.00 .06 .01 .02 -.02        
12) GDP Per Capita -.16 -.13 .03 .02 -.22 .45 .52 -.08 -.50 .15 .06       
13) Year .06 .13 .17 .11 -.03 .04 .36 -.01 -.23 .35 .16 .74      
14) Inflation -.04 -.21 -.08 -.16 .14 -.11 -.19 .12 .22 -.22 -.12 -.57 -.73     
15) Unemployment .28 .21 -.20 .04 .09 -.05 -.16 .01 .05 -.05 .17 .03 .38 -.24    
16) Military 
Spending 
.04 -.00 -.14 .01 -.28 .32 -.02 -.06 -.19 .02 -.07 -.07 -.31 .27 .11   
17) Mfg. and Ag. 
Emp. 
-.23 -.06 -.07 -.26 .04 -.15 -.36 -.04 .20 -.04 -.13 -.62 -.61 .43 -.56 -.20  
18) Labor Power .49 .39 .74 -.06 .84 -.63 .35 .23 .39 .50 .05 -.17 -.06 .04 -.22 -.33 .22 
19) Right Cabinet -.61 -.41 -.38 -.14 -.67 .51 .01 -.30 -.33 -.23 .04 .30 .26 -.33 -.13 .03 -.03 
20) Inward FDI .10 .03 .10 .24 .06 -.08 -.01 .06 .03 .06 .06 .20 .38 -.22 .35 -.03 -.52 
21) Inward PI .06 .05 .04 -.01 .07 .06 .07 -.14 -.01 .13 -.01 .26 .38 -.31 .19 -.16 -.27 
22) Net Investment -.04 -.13 -.05 -.22 .09 .07 -.00 -.15 .15 -.23 .01 -.12 -.14 .16 .03 .00 .09 
23) Exports .50 .48 .33 .35 .39 -.55 -.20 .13 .27 .27 -.01 -.14 .15 -.20 .26 -.25 -.18 
24) Net Trade .19 .23 .20 .28 .19 -.25 .09 .14 -.09 .18 .10 .19 .45 -.45 .27 -.31 -.29 
25) Net 
Globalization 
.13 .09 .12 .05 .23 -.15 .06 -.00 .06 -.04 .09 .06 .26 -.24 .26 -.26 -.17 
26) FDI Openness .17 .18 .15 .42 -.01 -.11 .09 .12 -.11 .18 .05 .31 .46 -.31 .24 -.03 -.54 
27) Investment 
Openness 
.10 .11 .09 .15 .04 -.01 .06 -.03 -.06 .23 .00 .33 .49 -.39 .25 -.15 -.42 
28) Trade 
Openness 
.51 .47 .32 .33 .38 -.55 -.22 .12 .29 .27 -.02 -.17 .11 -.16 .25 -.22 -.16 
29) Total 
Globalization 
.47 .45 .31 .33 .35 -.49 -.18 .10 .24 .29 -.02 -.07 .21 -.24 .28 -.23 -.24 
30) Capital 
Accounts Liberal. 
.16 .30 -.06 .16 -.21 .29 .09 -.09 -.33 .32 .06 .53 .56 -.51 .38 .16 -.46 
31) Current 
Accounts Liberal. 
.01 .19 -.10 .18 -.30 .34 .13 -.12 -.42 .09 .06 .49 .51 -.55 .17 -.03 -.34 
32) Outward FDI .19 .25 .16 .48 -.07 -.11 .16 .14 -.20 .24 .04 .33 .43 -.33 .11 -.02 -.45 
33) Outward PI .04 .07 .05 .07 .03 .00 .00 -.03 -.05 .25 -.02 .27 .41 -.35 .21 -.15 -.31 
34) Imports .51 .47 .31 .31 .38 -.54 -.23 .11 .31 .26 -.03 -.20 .06 -.12 .23 -.20 -.13 
35) Net Migration -.12 -.13 -.04 -.01 -.18 .46 .13 -.08 -.14 -.12 .01 .45 .25 -.15 -.09 -.04 -.26 
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Appendix 1 continued 
Panel B 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
18) Labor  
Power 
                 
19) Right Cabinet -.60                 
20) Inward FDI -.14 -.02                
21) Inward PI .01 .05 .41               
22) Net 
Investment 
.02 -.07 -.13 .30              
23) Exports .34 -.47 .48 .20 -.24             
24) Net Trade .16 -.14 .25 .06 -.27 .48            
25) Net 
Globalization 
.15 -.17 .10 .29 .60 .20 .60           
26) FDI 
Openness 
-.12 .01 .86 .38 -.35 .45 .33 -.02          
27) Investment 
Openness 
-.03 .06 .69 .85 -.19 .41 .23 .03 .71         
28) Trade  
Openness 
.34 -.48 .48 .20 -.22 .996 .40 .14 .43 .40        
29) Total  
Globalization 
.29 -.41 .58 .37 -.24 .97 .41 .14 .55 .59 .98       
30) Capital 
Accounts Liberal. 
-.26 .09 .27 .20 -.23 .14 .33 .08 .39 .35 .11 .18      
31) Current 
Accounts Liberal. 
-.26 .21 .23 .26 -.15 .01 .38 .19 .37 .34 -.03 .06 .75     
32) Outward FDI -.08 .03 .59 .28 -.46 .34 .32 -.12 .92 .60 .32 .42 .40 .42    
33) Outward PI -.01 .09 .56 .66 -.46 .40 .24 -.19 .55 .91 .40 .56 .31 .27 .44   
34) Imports .34 -.48 .47 .20 -.20 .98 .31 .08 .42 .39 .99 .97 .08 -.07 .30 .39  
35) Net Migration -.20 .16 .11 .16 .15 -.12 -.03 .10 .12 .11 -.12 -.08 .25 .29 .11 .01 -.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
